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Post-1980 U.S. data trace out a stable long-run money demand relationship of Cagan's semi-log form
between the M1-income ratio and the nominal interest rate, with an interest semi-elasticity below 2.
Integrating under this money demand curve yields estimates of the welfare costs of modest departures
from Friedman's zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money that are quite small.
The results suggest that the Federal Reserve's current policy, which generates low but still positive
rates of inflation, provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms to the alternative of moving
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Inﬂation, brought under control in the early eighties, remains subdued today. Still, the
question remains: what cost does the Federal Reserve’s well-established policy of low but
positive inﬂation impose on the economy, when compared to the optimal monetary policy
prescribed by Friedman (1969), which calls for a deﬂation that makes the nominal interest
rate equal to zero?
Lucas (2000), working in the tradition of Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969), addresses
this question directly. Lucas’ analysis juxtaposes two competing speciﬁcations for money
demand. One, inspired by Meltzer (1963), relates the natural logarithm of m,t h er a t i oo f
nominal money balances to nominal income, to the natural logarithm of r, the short-term
nominal interest rate, according to
ln(m)=l n ( A) − ηln(r) (1)
where A>0 is a constant and η>0 measures the absolute value of the interest elasticity
of money demand. The other, adapted from Cagan (1956), links the log of m instead to the
level of r via
ln(m)=l n ( B) − ξr, (2)
where B>0 is a constant and ξ>0 measures the absolute value of the interest semi-
elasticity of money demand.
Figure 1 plots the log-log demand curve (1) and the semi-log demand curve (2) on the
same graph, where the axes measure both m and r in levels. Lucas’ (2000) preferred spec-
iﬁcations set η =0 .5 in (1) and ξ =7in (2), then pin down the constants A =0 .0488 and
B =0 .3548 so that ln(A) equals the average value of ln(m)+ηln(r) and ln(B) equals the
average value of ln(m)+ξr in annual U.S. data, 1900-1994. These same settings determine
the curvature and horizontal placement of the two curves in Figure 1.
The graphs highlight how (1) and (2) describe very diﬀerent money demand behavior at
1low interest rates: as r approaches zero, (1) implies that real balances become arbitrarily
large, while (2) implies that real balances reach the ﬁnite satiation point B when expressed
as a fraction of real income. Hence, as emphasized by Lucas (2000), these competing money
demand speciﬁcations also have very diﬀe r e n ti m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h ew e l f a r ec o s to fm o d e s t
departures from Friedman’s (1969) zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity
of money.
Bailey’s (1956) traditional approach measures this welfare cost by integrating under the
money demand curve as the interest rate rises from zero to r>0 to ﬁn dt h el o s tc o n s u m e r
surplus then subtracting oﬀ the seigniorage revenue rm to isolate the deadweight loss. Let












[1 − (1 + ξr)e
−ξr] (4)
when money demand takes the semi-log form (2). If, as assumed by Lucas, the steady-
state real interest rate equals three percent, so that r =0 .03 prevails under a policy of zero
inﬂation or price stability, then (3) and (4) imply that this policy costs the economy the
equivalent of 0.85 percent of income when money demand is log-log, but only 0.10 percent
of income when money demand has the semi-log form. Likewise, an ongoing two percent
inﬂation costs the economy 1.09 percent of income under (1) and (3), but only 0.25 percent
of income under (2) and (4).
These calculations underscore the importance of discerning the appropriate form of the
money demand function before evaluating alternative monetary policies, including those that
generate very low but positive rates of inﬂation. Hence, Figure 1 also plots U.S. data on the
money-income ratio and the nominal interest rate from an annual sample extending from 1900
2through 1994 that is constructed, as described below in the Appendix, to resemble closely the
one used by Lucas (2000). Following Lucas, m is measured by dividing the M1 money stock
by nominal GDP and r is measured by the six-month commercial paper rate. Based on the
same comparison between these data and the plots of (1) and (2) shown in Figure 1, Lucas
concludes that the log-log speciﬁcation provides a better ﬁt and thereby argues implicitly
that the Federal Reserve could secure a substantial welfare gain for American consumers
by abandoning its current, low-but-positive inﬂation policy and adopting the Friedman rule
instead.
Some doubts about Lucas’ (2000) argument arise, however, once one recognizes that the
log-log speciﬁcation appears to deliver a substantially better ﬁt in Figure 1 thanks in large
part to its ability to track data points in two extreme clusters: one group that lies farthest
out along the x-axis, representing (m,r) pairs such that m exceeds 0.4, and another group
that lies highest up along the y-axis, representing (m,r) pairs such that r exceeds 0.1.T h e
ﬁrst cluster of data points, with m>0.4, come from 1945 through 1949. Interest rates
remained low during this period, as the Federal Reserve retained its policy, ﬁrst adopted
during World War II, of supporting the prices of U.S. Treasury securities. Yet, compared
to the actual wartime period from 1941 through 1944, interest rates moved slightly higher
during 1945 through 1949 and, still, the money-income ratio moved sharply higher as well.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp.580-5) attribute this anomalous behavior of money demand
to widespread fears, ultimately unfounded, of a return to 1930s-style deﬂation and depression
following the end of hostilities. Meanwhile, the second cluster of data points, with r>0.1,
come from 1979-1982 and 1984, following a period of ﬁnancial deregulation and innovation
as well Goldfeld’s (1976) famous “missing money” episode of money demand instability.
Viewed in one way, these two clusters of data points might be quite informative, since
they reveal how the demand for M1 in the United States changed when, ﬁrst, interest rates
fell to very low levels in the late 1940s and then, later, interest rates reached historical highs
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But, all the same, one might wonder if Lucas’ (2000)
3preferred log-log money demand speciﬁcation owes much of its apparent success in tracking
the data from Figure 1 to its ability to link – perhaps spuriously – two disparate and
unusual episodes in U.S. monetary history. And one might also wonder, more speciﬁcally,
about the relevance of the data points from 1945 through 1949 – a distant period when the
U.S. ﬁnancial system and indeed the U.S. economy as a whole looked very diﬀerent from the
way they appear now – to an exercise that evaluates Federal Reserve policy today.
Fortunately, new data have accumulated since the mid-1990s that quite usefully comple-
ment those used in Lucas’ (2000) study and oﬀer up a chance to check on the robustness of
his results and conclusions. Importantly, these new data include observations from a much
more recent episode from 2002 through 2004 that also features very low nominal interest
rates. Hence, Figure 2 reproduces Figure 1 after updating Lucas’ sample to run through
2006. The more recent data also cover a period when the development and proliferation
of retail deposit sweep programs, involving banks’ eﬀorts to reclassify their checkable de-
posits as money market deposits and thereby avoid statutory reserve requirements, severely
distort oﬃcial measures of the M1 money stock. Since, as argued by Anderson (2003b),
these sweep operations take place behind the scenes, invisible to the eyes of most account
holders, Figure 2 uses data on the M1RS aggregate, deﬁned and constructed by Dutkowsky
and Cynamon (2003), Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones (2006), and Dutkowsky, Cynamon,
and Jones (2006) by adding the value of swept funds back into the standard M1 ﬁgures, to
measure the money-income ratio since 1994.
To focus more clearly on the recent behavior of money demand, Figure 2 distinguishes
between the data from 1980-2006 and the data from 1900-1979, the breakpoint coinciding
with both the arrival of Paul Volcker at the Federal Reserve Board and the implementation
of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 as key events
marking the start of a new chapter in U.S. monetary history. Strikingly, the data points from
the post-1980 period also trace out what looks like a stable money demand relationship, but
o n et h a ts e e m sv e r yd i ﬀerent from the log-log speciﬁcation preferred by Lucas (2000) based
4on his examination of the earlier data.
Even after correcting for the eﬀects of retail sweep programs, money balances displayed
only modest growth relative to income during the 2002-2004 episode of very low interest
rates, suggesting that the semi-log speciﬁcation (2) with its ﬁnite satiation point may now
provide a more accurate description of money demand. Furthermore, the new data points
appear to trace out a demand curve that is far less interest-elastic than either of the two
curves drawn in to track the earlier data from Figure 1. Both of these shifts, in functional
form and towards a smaller (in absolute value) elasticity or semi-elasticity, work to reduce
Lucas’ (2000) estimate of the welfare cost of inﬂation. But, to make sure that the patterns
appearing in Figure 2 are real and not optical illusions and to sharpen the quantitative
estimate of the welfare cost of inﬂation implied by the recent behavior of money demand,
the next section presents some more formal statistical results.
2 ... and the Recent Behavior of Money Demand
While Lucas’ (2000) focus on a long historical time series extending back to the start of the
previous century requires the use of annual data, the focus here on the post-1980 period allows
for the use of readily-available quarterly ﬁgures, again as described below in the Appendix.
Running from 1980:1 through 2006:4, the money-income ratio is measured by dividing the
sweep-adjusted M1 money stock, the M1RS aggregate referred to above, by nominal GDP.
And since the Federal Reserve discontinued its reported series for the six-month commercial
paper rate in 1997, the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate serves instead as the measure of r;
in any case, U.S. Treasury bills come closer to matching the risk-free, nominally-denominated
bonds that serve as an alternative store of value in theoretical models of money demand.
Following most of the empirical literature on U.S. money demand since Hafer and Jansen
(1991) and Hoﬀman and Rasche (1991), the econometric analysis of these data revolves
around the ideas of nonstationarity and cointegration introduced by Engle and Granger
5(1987). Speciﬁcally, a ﬁnding that the semi-log speciﬁcation (2) describes a cointegrating
relationship linking two nonstationary variables, the money-income ratio and the nominal
interest rate, coupled with a ﬁnding that the log-log speciﬁcation (1) fails to describe the
same sort of relationship, provides formal statistical evidence supporting the more casual
impressions gleaned from visual inspection of Figure 2 that the semi-log form oﬀers a better
ﬁtt ot h ep o s t - 1 9 8 0d a t a .
Note that these statistical tests, which check ﬁrst for nonstationarity in and then coin-
tegration between the variables ln(m) and ln(r) i n( 1 )a n dt h ev a r i a b l e sln(m) and r in (2),
require one to adopt a somewhat schizophrenic view of the data since, in a linear statistical
framework, the analysis of (1) requires ln(r) to follow an autoregressive process with a unit
root, while the same analysis of (2) requires r to follow an autoregressive process with a unit
root. Bae (2005) helps to cure this schizophrenia by providing a more detailed discussion of
the case in which both (1) and (2) can be estimated under the common assumption that r
follows an autoregressive process with a unit root, with (1) viewed as a nonlinear relationship
between ln(m) and r and (2) viewed as a linear relationship between the same two variables.
The analysis here, by contrast, follows Anderson and Rasche (2001) by putting the two com-
peting speciﬁcations on equal footing ex-ante, treating both as linear relationships linking
ln(m) and ln(r) in one case and ln(m) and r in the other.
Table 1 displays results from applying the Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root test described
by Hamilton (1994, Ch.17) to each of the three variables: ln(m), ln(r),a n dr.T h e t a -
ble reports values for ˆ μ and ˆ ρ, the intercept and slope coeﬃcients from an ordinary least
squares regression of each variable on a constant and its own lagged value, together with
the Phillips-Perron test statistic Zt, which corrects the conventional t-statistic for testing
the null hypothesis of a unit root, ρ =1 , for serial correlation in the regression error using
the Newey-West (1987) estimator of the error variance. In particular, Table 1 reports Zt as
computed for values of the lag truncation parameter q, that is, the bound on the number of
sample autocovariances used in computing the Newey-West estimate, ranging from 0 (im-
6posing no serial correlation, in which case Zt coincides with the more familiar t-statistic) to
8 (allowing for positive autocorrelations running out to eight quarters or two years). Critical
values for Zt appear under the heading “Case 2” in Hamilton’s (1994, p.763) Table B.6.
None of these test statistics allows the null hypothesis of a unit root to be rejected, paving
the way for tests of cointegration between pairs of these apparently nonstationary variables.
Intuitively, the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) test for cointegration described by Hamilton
(1994, Ch.19) uses ordinary least squares to estimate the intercept and slope coeﬃcient
in the linear relationship (1) linking the nonstationary variables ln(m) and ln(r) or (2) link-
ing the nonstationary variables ln(m) and r, then applies a Phillips-Perron (1988) test to
determine whether the regression error from the equation is stationary or nonstationary. In
the case where the null hypothesis of a unit root in the error can be rejected, then either (1)
or (2) represents a cointegrating relationship: a stationary linear combination of two nonsta-
tionary variables. Table 2 displays results associated with these Phillips-Ouliaris tests: the
intercept and slope coeﬃcients ˆ α and ˆ β from a linear regression of the form (1) or (2), the
slope coeﬃcient ˆ ρ from a regression of the error term from (1) or (2) on its own lagged value
(without a constant, since the error has mean zero), and the Phillips-Ouliaris statistic Zt for
values of the Newey-West (1987) lag truncation parameter q ranging again between 0 and
8.C r i t i c a l v a l u e s f o r Zt so constructed appear under the heading “Case 2” in Hamilton’s
(1994, p.766) Table B.9.
Conﬁrming the apparent breakdown from Figure 2 of Lucas’ (2000) preferred log-log
speciﬁcation in the post-1980 data, none of the tests summarized in Table 2’s top panel
rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration between ln(m) and ln(r). On the other hand,
all of the tests in the table’s bottom panel reject their null of no cointegration between
ln(m) and r a tt h e9 0o r9 5p e r c e n tc o n ﬁdence level. Taken together, these results provide
statistical evidence of a tighter money demand relationship of the semi-log form for the
post-1980 period. And again conﬁrming the visual impressions from Figure 2, the estimated
semi-elasticity of 1.79 (in absolute value) for 1980-2006 stands far below Lucas’ choice of 7
7made to ﬁt the data from 1900-1994.
Both of Lucas’ (2000) speciﬁcations (1) and (2) impose a unitary income elasticity of
money demand by relating the interest rate terms ln(r) and r to the log of the money-income
ratio ln(m). To make sure that the failure of the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) tests summarized
in Table 2 to reject their null hypothesis of no cointegration between ln(m) and ln(r) does
not stem directly from the imposition of this additional constraint, Table 3 displays results
of Phillips-Ouliaris tests applied to the more ﬂexible speciﬁcation that links the log of real
money balances ln(M/P) to the log of real GDP ln(Y/P) and the log of the nominal interest
rate ln(r),w i t ht h eG D Pd e ﬂator P used to convert both series for money M and income
Y from nominal to real. Hence, the table shows the ordinary least squares estimates of
the intercept ˆ α together with the slope coeﬃcients ˆ βy and ˆ βr that measure the income and
interest elasticities of money demand. And, as before, the table shows values of the Phillips-
Ouliaris statistic Zt for values of the Newey-West (1987) lag truncation parameter q ranging
between 0 and 8. In Table 3, however, the critical values for Zt diﬀer from those in Table
2, partly because the regression includes two right-hand-side variables instead of one, but
also because the upward trend in the new right-hand-side variable ln(Y/P) requires that the
entries from the “Case 3” panel of Hamilton’s (1994, p.766) Table B.9 be used in place of
those from “Case 2” from before.
In Table 3, the point estimate ˆ βy =1 .10 of the income elasticity parameter exceeds
unity, and estimate ˆ βr =0 .057 of the interest elasticity parameter declines when compared
to the case shown in Table 2 where a unitary income elasticity is imposed. Nevertheless, the
basic result from Table 2 – that none of the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) tests rejects its null
hypothesis of no cointegration – carries over to Table 3, conﬁrming the robustness of that
basic result and casting further doubt on the relevance of the log-log speciﬁcation (1).
Table 4, meanwhile, builds on the success of the semi-log speciﬁcation (2) by present-
ing “dynamic OLS” (DOLS) estimates of the parameters of the cointegrating relationship
linking ln(m) and r. Each of the parameter estimates in this table comes from an ordinary
8least squares regression of ln(m) on a constant, the level of the nominal interest rate r,a n d
p leads and lags of ∆r, the quarter-to-quarter change in the nominal interest rate. Impor-
tantly, these dynamic regressions assume that the nonstationary variables ln(m) and r are
cointegrated; unlike the static regressions from Table 2, they cannot be used to test the hy-
potheses of cointegration or no cointegration. On the other hand, Stock and Watson (1993)
and Hamilton (1994, Ch.19) demonstrate that under the assumption of cointegration, the
dynamic OLS estimates are asymptotically eﬃcient and asymptotically equivalent to max-
imum likelihood estimates obtained, for example, through Johansen’s (1988) methods. In
addition, conventional Wald test statistics formed from these dynamic OLS estimates have
conventional normal or chi-squared asymptotic distributions, making it possible to draw fa-
miliar comparisons between the parameter estimates and their standard errors. Again as
explained by Stock and Watson (1993) and Hamilton (1994), adding leads and lags of ∆r
to the estimated equations controls for possible correlation between the interest rate r and
the residual from the cointegrating relationship linking ln(m) and r; however, any serial cor-
relation that remains in the error term from the dynamic equation must still be accounted
for when constructing standard errors for the DOLS estimates. Therefore, Table 4 reports
DOLS estimates of the intercept and slope coeﬃcients ˆ α and ˆ β from the cointegrating rela-
tionship, together with standard errors se(ˆ β) for ˆ β computed using Newey and West’s (1987)
estimator of the regression error variance for various values of the lag truncation parameter
q.
The dynamic OLS estimates from Table 4 resemble quite closely their static counterparts
shown in Table 2. In addition, for all values of p, the number of leads and lags of ∆r included
in the dynamic regressions, and for all values of q, the number of regression-error autocor-
relations allowed for in Newey-West variance estimator, the comparison between the point
estimate and its standard error made possible by the fact that the conventional t-statistic
ˆ β/se(ˆ β) has the usual, normal asymptotic distribution, conﬁrms that the estimated interest
elasticity of money demand diﬀers signiﬁcantly from zero. The tight standard errors around
9the point estimates of 1.8 to 1.9 also conﬁrm that interest semi-elasticity is signiﬁcantly
smaller in absolute value than Lucas’ (2000) setting of 7.
Finally, Table 5 follows Table 3 by relaxing the assumption of a unitary income elasticity
of money demand, but this time for the semi-log speciﬁcation and using the dynamic OLS
approach justiﬁed by the previous ﬁnding of cointegration between the money-income ratio
and the level of the nominal interest rate. The table reports point estimates ˆ α, ˆ βy,a n dˆ βr
o ft h ei n t e r c e p ta n ds l o p ec o e ﬃcients from the cointegrating relationship linking the log of
real money balances ln(M/P) to the log of real income ln(Y/P) and the level of the nominal
interest rate r,w h e np leads and lags of the changes ∆ln(Y/P) and ∆r in real income and
the interest rate are also included in the ordinary least squares regression. The table shows
standard errors se(ˆ βy) and se(ˆ βr) for ˆ βy and ˆ βr as well, corrected for serial correlation using
Newey and West’s (1987) estimator of the regression error variance for various values of
the lag truncation parameter q, and corresponding Wald (F) statistics for testing the null
hypothesis of a unitary income elasticity maintained in the previous regressions.
Notably, while the point estimates of the income elasticity in Table 5 come in slightly
higher than one, none of the Wald tests rejects its null hypothesis of a unitary income
elasticity. And, as in Table 4, comparisons of ˆ βr and se(ˆ βr) reveal that the estimates of the
interest semi-elasticity are not only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but also signiﬁcantly
smaller in absolute value than Lucas’ (2000) setting of 7.
All of these results point to the semi-log speciﬁcation (2) with a unitary income elasticity
of money demand as providing the best description of the post-1980 data. Accordingly, Table
6 presents estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation implied by the corresponding formula (4),
based on the regression results shown previously in Tables 2 and 4. Since, as noted above,
the static and dynamic OLS estimates look quite similar, so do the implied welfare costs.
Assuming, as before, that the steady-state real interest rate equals three percent, so that
r =0 .03 corresponds to zero inﬂation, r =0 .05 corresponds to two percent annual inﬂation,
and r =0 .13 corresponds to ten percent annual inﬂation, the regression coeﬃcients put the
10welfare cost of pursuing a policy of price stability as opposed to the Friedman (1969) rule at
less than 0.015 percent of income, the cost of two percent inﬂation at less than 0.04 percent
of income, and the cost of ten percent inﬂation at less than 0.25 percent of income. These
welfare cost estimates lie far below those computed by Lucas (2000) and bring the analysis
full circle, back to Figures 1 and 2 and the apparent steepening and leftward shift of the
money demand function in the years since 1980. Interestingly, these ﬁgures also provide
estimates of the cost of ten percent inﬂation compared to price stability, w(0.13) −w(0.03),
that lie between 0.20 and 0.22 percent of income, numbers that are still smaller than, but
resemble more closely, Fischer’s (1981) estimate of 0.30 p e r c e n to fi n c o m ea n dL u c a s ’( 1 9 8 1 )
estimate of 0.45 percent of income.
These results suggest that the Federal Reserve’s current policy, which generates low
but still positive rates of inﬂation, provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms
to the alternative of moving all the way to Friedman’s (1969) deﬂationary rule for a zero
nominal interest rate. Before closing, however, it should be emphasized that these welfare
cost estimates account only for the money demand distortion brought about by positive
nominal interest rates. Dotsey and Ireland (1996) demonstrate that, in general equilibrium,
other marginal decisions can also be distorted when inﬂation rises, impacting on both the
level and growth rate of aggregate output, while Feldstein (1997) argues that the interactions
between inﬂation and a tax code that is not completely indexed can add substantially to the
welfare cost of inﬂation. To the extent that these additional sources of ineﬃciency remain
present in the post-1980 U.S. economy, there will of course be larger gains to reducing
inﬂation below its current low level.
Two extensions to the analysis here and in Lucas (2000) immediately suggest themselves
and, indeed, were pointed to originally by Lucas himself. First, this study follows Lucas
(2000) by using assumptions about the functional form of the money demand curve, justiﬁed
by observations on the behavior of money demand at low, but still positive, interest rates, to
draw inferences about the behavior of money demand as those interest rates approach zero,
11the key issue being not so much whether the demand for money depends on the logarithm or
the level of the nominal interest rate but instead, whether there does or does not exist some
ﬁnite satiation point that places a limit on money demand under the Friedman (1969) rule.
This empirical strategy makes the data from the most recent episode, from 2002 through
2004, of low nominal interest rates in the United States particularly important here in the
same way that, as argued above, data from the earlier episode from 1945 through 1949 are
for the conclusions in Lucas (2000). Finding additional sources of information about the
limiting behavior of money demand as interest rates approach zero, whether from time-
series data from other economies or from cross-sectional data as suggested by Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (2000), remains a critical task for sharpening existing estimates of the welfare
cost of modest rates of inﬂation. Second, the analysis here and in Lucas (2000) uses M1 as
the measure of money, based on the idea that this narrow aggregate reﬂects most closely
the medium of exchange role that money plays in theory. Broadening the empirical focus by
examining how the demand for other liquid assets behaves under very low nominal interest
rates and the theoretical focus by deriving the implications of this behavior for estimates of
the welfare cost of inﬂation, perhaps through the Divisia approach to monetary aggregation
pioneered by Barnett (1980), remains another critical task for future research.
3 Appendix: Data Sources
The annual data displayed in Figures 1 and 2 come from sources identical or very closely
comparable to those used by Lucas (2000). To measure money, ﬁgures on M1 for 1900-1914
are taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960, Series X-267). Figures on M1 for 1915-
1958 are taken from Anderson (2003a, Table 3, Columns 3 and 10) and come, originally,
from Friedman and Schwartz (1970) for 1915-1946 and Rasche (1987, 1990) for 1947-1958.
Figures on M1 for 1959-2006 are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED
database and are adjusted from 1994 onward by adding back into M1 the funds removed
12by retail deposit sweep programs using estimates described by Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and
Jones (2006).
To measure nominal income, ﬁgures on nominal GDP for 1900-1928 are constructed by
taking Kendrick’s (1961, Table A-III, Column 5) series for real GDP and multiplying it by
a series for the deﬂator constructed by dividing nominal GNP (Table A-IIb, Column 11) by
real GNP (Table A-III, Column 1). Lucas (2000), too, uses the deﬂator for GNP to translate
Kendrick’s ﬁgures for real GDP into a corresponding series for nominal GDP; though his
source for the deﬂator is U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960, Series F-5), the numbers from
that table resemble quite closely those that come directly from Kendrick’s (1961) monograph.
Figures on nominal GDP for 1929-2006 come from the FRED database.
Finally, to measure the nominal interest rate, data on the six-month commercial paper
rate are taken from Friedman and Schwartz (1982, Table 4.8, Column 6) for 1900-1975 and
from the Economic Report of the President (2003, Table B-73) for 1976-1997. The Federal
Reserve stopped publishing the interest rate series reported in this last source in 1997; hence,
the interest rate for 1998-2006 is the three-month AA nonﬁnancial commercial paper rate,
drawn from the FRED database.
The quarterly, post-1980 data used in the econometric analysis summarized in Tables
1-6 all come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database, except that the
series for M1 is adjusted by adding back the funds removed by retail deposit sweep programs
using estimates described by Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones (2006): the money stock is
therefore measured by their M1RS aggregate. Nominal GDP again measures income, and
the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate measures the nominal interest rate. Finally, in the
regressions that use real money balances and real GDP independently instead of together
in the form of the money-income ratio, the nominal series for money and income are both
divided by the GDP deﬂator.
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17Table 1. Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results
ln(m)ˆ μ ˆ ρqZ t
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Notes: Each panel reports ˆ μ and ˆ ρ, the intercept and slope coeﬃcient from an ordinary
least squares regression of the variable on a constant and its own lag, together with
Zt, the Phillips-Perron statistic corrected for autocorrelation in the regression error,
computed using the Newey-West estimate of the error variance for various values of the
lag truncation parameter q. The critical values for Zt are reported by Hamilton (1994,
Table B.6, p.763): −2.58 (10 percent), −2.89 (5 percent), and −3.51 (1 percent).Table 2. Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration Test Results
ln(m)=α − β ln(r)ˆ α ˆ β ˆ ρq Z t









ln(m)=α − βr ˆ α ˆ β ˆ ρq Z t









Notes: Each panel reports ˆ α and ˆ β, the intercept and slope coeﬃcient from the ordinary
least squares regression of ln(m) on ln(r) or r; ˆ ρ,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcient from an ordinary
least squares regression of the corresponding regression error on its own lagged value;
and Zt, the Phillips-Ouliaris statistic for ρ =1 , corrected for autocorrelation in the
residual, computed using the Newey-West estimate of the error variance for various
values of the lag truncation parameter q. The critical values for Zt are reported by
Hamilton (1994, Table B.9, p.766): −3.07 (10 percent), −3.37 (5 percent), and −3.96
(1 percent). Hence ∗ and ∗∗ indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can
be rejected at the 90 and 95 percent conﬁdence levels.Table 3. Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration Test Results
ln(M/P)=α + βy ln(Y/P) − βr ln(r)ˆ α ˆ βy ˆ βr ˆ ρqZ t









Notes: The table reports ˆ α, ˆ βy,a n dˆ βr, the intercept and slope coeﬃcients from the ordinary least squares regression of
ln(M/P) on ln(Y/P) and ln(r); ˆ ρ,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcient from an ordinary least squares regression of the regression error
on its own lagged value; and Zt, the Phillips-Ouliaris statistic for ρ =1 , corrected for autocorrelation in the residual,
computed using the Newey-West estimate of the error variance for various values of the lag truncation parameter q.T h e
critical values for Zt are reported by Hamilton (1994, Table B.9, p.766): −3.52 (10 percent), −3.80 (5 percent), and −4.36
(1 percent).Table 4. Dynamic OLS Estimates
ln(m)=α − βr ˆ α ˆ βs e (ˆ β) pq
















Notes: Each panel shows ˆ α and ˆ β, the constant and slope coeﬃcients from the cointegrating
vector linking ln(m) and r, obtained from a dynamic ordinary least squares regression
of ln(m) on a constant, r,a n dp leads and lags of ∆r, together with the standard
error se(ˆ β) for ˆ β, corrected for autocorrelation in the residual and computed using
the Newey-West estimate of the error variance for various values of the lag trucation
parameter q.Table 5. Dynamic OLS Estimates
ln(M/P)=α + βy ln(Y/P) − βrr ˆ α ˆ βy se(ˆ βy) ˆ βr se(ˆ βr) pqW (βy =1 )
−2.0668 1.0329 0.0325 1.7066 0.2555 1 2 1.0194
0.0398 0.3122 4 0.6827
0.0443 0.3476 6 0.5509
0.0468 0.3673 8 0.4934
−1.9947 1.0254 0.0329 1.6952 0.2677 2 2 0.5965
0.0400 0.3260 4 0.4023
0.0444 0.3618 6 0.3267
0.0470 0.3828 8 0.2918
−2.0964 1.0361 0.0348 1.5159 0.3100 3 2 1.0716
0.0423 0.3760 4 0.7281
0.0468 0.4162 6 0.5943
0.0496 0.4411 8 0.5292
−2.1753 1.0440 0.0336 1.4736 0.3101 4 2 1.7126
0.0398 0.3676 4 1.2189
0.0439 0.4051 6 1.0033
0.0466 0.4298 8 0.8915
Notes: Each panel shows ˆ α, ˆ βy,a n dˆ βr, the constant and slope coeﬃcients from the cointegrating vector linking ln(M/P),
ln(Y/P),a n dr, obtained from a dynamic ordinary least squares regression of ln(M/P) on a constant, ln(Y/P), r,a n d
p leads and lags of ∆ln(Y/P) and ∆r, together with the standard errors se(ˆ βy) and se(ˆ βr) for ˆ βy and ˆ βr, corrected for
autocorrelation in the residual and computed using the Newey-West estimate of the error variance for various values of
the lag trucation parameter q, and the Wald (F)s t a t i s t i cW(βy =1 )for testing the null hypothesis of a unitary long-run
income elasticity of money demand. The critical values for W(βy =1 )are reported by Hamilton (1994, Table B.2, p.754):
2.71 (10 percent), 3.84 (5 percent), and 6.63 (1 percent).Table 6. Welfare Cost Estimates
Welfare Cost (Percent of Income)
Zero Inﬂation 2% Inﬂation 10% Inﬂation
Regression B =e x p ( ˆ α) ξ = ˆ βw (0.03) w(0.05) w(0.13)
Static OLS (Table 2) 0.1686 1.7944 0.0131 0.0356 0.2192
Dynamic OLS, p =1(Table 4) 0.1698 1.8939 0.0139 0.0377 0.2310
Dynamic OLS, p =2(Table 4) 0.1700 1.9013 0.0140 0.0379 0.2320
Dynamic OLS, p =3(Table 4) 0.1698 1.8639 0.0137 0.0372 0.2279
Dynamic OLS, p =4(Table 4) 0.1697 1.8261 0.0134 0.0365 0.2239
Notes: Each row presents estimates of the welfare costs of zero, two percent, and ten percent annual inﬂations based on
the regression results from Tables 2 and 4, using the formula (4) for the money demand speciﬁcation (2) with intercept
ln(B)=ˆ α and semi-elasticity ξ = ˆ β (in absolute value). The welfare cost calculations assume that the steady-state annual
real interest rate equals 3 percent, so that r =0 .03 under price stability, r =0 .05 under two percent annual inﬂation, and
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U.S. Data, 1900-1979 U.S. Data, 1980-2006